An Efficient Processor Architecture to Resist Side Channel Attacks

LI Hong; HE Zhang-qing; XU Yuan-zhong

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An Efficient Processor Architecture to Resist Side Channel Attacks

更新时间：2026-09-04

- An Efficient Processor Architecture to Resist Side Channel Attacks
- Vol. 33, Issue 5, Pages: 6-9(2016)
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 湖北工业大学机构计算机科学与技术学院,湖北,武汉,430068
  2. 华中科技大学计算机科学与技术学院,湖北,武汉,430074
  3. 湖北工业大学太阳能高效利用湖北省协同创新中心,湖北,武汉,430068
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
- DOI：
  CLC：
- Published：2016
- 稿件说明：
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李红, 贺章擎, 徐元中. 一种基于随机指令延迟的抗旁路攻击处理器结构[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2016, 33(5): 6-9, 14.

LI Hong, HE Zhang-qing, XU Yuan-zhong. An Efficient Processor Architecture to Resist Side Channel Attacks[J]. 2016, 33(5): 6-9.
李红, 贺章擎, 徐元中. 一种基于随机指令延迟的抗旁路攻击处理器结构[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2016, 33(5): 6-9, 14. DOI：

LI Hong, HE Zhang-qing, XU Yuan-zhong. An Efficient Processor Architecture to Resist Side Channel Attacks[J]. 2016, 33(5): 6-9. DOI：

摘要

提出了一种基于随机延迟的高效的抗旁路攻击处理器结构

综合采用随机指令调度、随机指令注入和随机流水段延迟技术以抵抗旁路攻击.基于ARM7处理器实现了该架构

实现结果表明本处理器比原始ARM7处理器增加了约20%的硬件面积.通过相关系数分析攻击(Correlation Power Analysis

CPA)实验证明

采用本架构的处理器具备有极高的抗旁路攻击防护能力

可以应用在USBKEY、智能卡(Smart CARD)等高安全应用场合.

Abstract

In this article

based on random delay insertion

an effective processor architecture resistant to side-channel attacks was proposed. It used a combination of randomized scheduling

randomized instruction insertion and randomized pipeline-delay to resist side-channel attacks. On the base of ARM7 processor

we implemented this architecture and the implementation results showed that this processor has increased approximate 20% in hardware area than the original ARM7 processor. The CPA attack experiment results suggested that our new secure processor have high capacity to resist side-channel attacks and thus could be used in USBKEY

Smart CARD and other application scenarios which require extremely high security level.

关键词

Keywords

references

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Tiri K, Hwang D, Hodjat A, et al. A side-channel leakage free coprocessor IC in 0.18μm cmos for embedded AES-based cryptographic and biometric processing[C]// Proc. IEEE/ACM Design Automa. Conf. New York, 2005: 222-227.

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Berlin Mangard S, Oswald E, Popp T, et al. Power analysis attacks: revealing the secrets of smart cards[M]. Berlin, Springer, 2007.

Charvillon N V, Medwed M, Kerckhof S, et al. Shuffling against side-channel attacks a comprehensive study with cautionary note[C]// ASIACRYPT 2012, LNCS. Beijing, 2012: 740-757.

贺章擎, 敖天勇, 刘恺, 等. 基于随机指令注入的抗旁路攻击硬件防护技术[J]. 华中科技大学学报(自然科学版), 2014, 42(5): 128-132. DOI: 128

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