the shorter key length is needed in the same security strength
so SM2 is more suitable for the application to the resource limited smart card. For the security of application of SM2
people study the variety point multiplication algorithms with countermeasures to resist the side channel attacks. This paper proposes a new simple side-channel analysis (SPA) method based conditional subtraction to attack two usual SM2 algorithms with countermeasures. Experimental results show that this method only needs a power trace
which can be used to break the SM2 key in a few seconds. At the same time
this paper also demonstrates some countermeasures to resist the attack.
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