抗相关性功耗分析的DES掩码方案

杨正文; 郭筝

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抗相关性功耗分析的DES掩码方案

更新时间：2026-09-04

- 抗相关性功耗分析的DES掩码方案
- Masking scheme against correlation power analysis on DES
- 微电子学与计算机 2019年36卷第9期页码：1-6
- 作者机构：
  
  上海交通大学电子信息与电气工程学院,上海,200240
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
- DOI：
  中图分类号：
- 纸质出版：2019
- 稿件说明：
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杨正文, 郭筝. 抗相关性功耗分析的DES掩码方案[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2019, 36(9): 1-6.

YANG Zheng-wen, GUO Zheng. Masking scheme against correlation power analysis on DES[J]. 2019, 36(9): 1-6.
杨正文, 郭筝. 抗相关性功耗分析的DES掩码方案[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2019, 36(9): 1-6. DOI：

YANG Zheng-wen, GUO Zheng. Masking scheme against correlation power analysis on DES[J]. 2019, 36(9): 1-6. DOI：

摘要

以相关性功耗分析为代表的旁路攻击技术对密码设备的安全性造成严重威胁

针对这种情况

本文提出了一种新型的抗相关性功耗攻击的掩码防护方案.该方案是一种流水线式的"非对称掩码技术"

通过流水线式操作

使得加密过程中的每一轮都引入了不同的随机掩码

功耗和操作数之间的相关性被扰乱

从而抵御相关性攻击.我们通过功耗仿真

采集了标准DES、对称掩码方案及本文提出防护方案对应的功耗仿真曲线

并对其进行相关性功耗攻击.实验结果表明

标准DES需要1 000条可以攻击成功

对称掩码方案需要4 000条功耗曲线可以攻击成功

非对称防护方案则需要50 000条曲线才能攻击成功

防护能力提升了10倍以上

掩码方案可以有效抵抗相关性功耗分析.

Abstract

With the situation that side channel attack poses a serious threat to the security of cryptographic devices

we propose a new scheme of pipelined "asymmetric masking technology" against correlation power analysis and implement it in DES algorithm. Through pipelined operation

different random masks are introduced in each round of the encryption process

so that the correlation between power consumption and processing data is disturbed and we can resist correlation power analysis. Through power simulation

we collected the standard DES

symmetric mask scheme and the power simulation curve corresponding to the proposed protection scheme

and conducted related power consumption attacks. The experimental results show that the standard DES requires 1000 power consumption curves

and the symmetric mask scheme requires 4000 power consumption curves to successfully attack. The protection scheme proposed in this paper requires 50

000 curves to successfully attack

and the protection capability is improved by more than 10 times. We can say that scheme can achieve great protection.

关键词

Keywords

references

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ZAFAR Y, PARK J, HAR D, et al. Random clocking induced DPA attack immunity in FPGA[C]//IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology. Gwangju, Korea, IEEE, 2010: 1068-1070.

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