Considering the problem of negotiation of air traffic rights resources

this paper studies the game relation between the two sides of the negotiation based on the strategic negotiation relationship and the principle of equivalence of value. On the basis of the bargaining power

compensation of related industries

value of reserved space

and lost value by resource vacancy

a method was proposed to describe the value of the issue of air traffic rights resources

and the material income matrix aimed at different types of issues was established. Based on the theory of reciprocal preference

the reciprocal motivation and ex-parte-patronage motivation were proposed to describe the psychological utility brought by the game behaviors of the negotiators in the context of strategic negotiation relationship

and the sequential reciprocal game model based on reciprocal psychological utility was constructed. Numerical simulation was carried out and the validity of the model was verified. Results show that when the two sides of the negotiation were in a reciprocal relationship

the game behavior strategy was decided by the reciprocity sensitivity coefficient

issue scale of air traffic rights resources

and the relationship between the value of reserved space and the lost value by resource vacancy. The negotiation problem was identified to correspond to six value game scenarios

which were mainly determined by the value range of the issue.